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Abstract 
This paper considers the dangers for social science when the predictive 
urge extends to prophesy, the conviction that the future is already 
knowable. Seen from a spatial perspective, futurology frequently relies 
on the theoretical aggrandisement of contemporary places to press its 
claim that the future of space has already been foretold in contemporary 
events. Two cases are essayed as cautionary tales: first, the inflated 
claims made in the social sciences during the 1980s for Los Angeles as a 
preview of an inevitable post-modern future for global capitalism; and 
second, the more recent, and no less extravagant, commentaries which 
have trumpeted contemporary, neo-liberal New Zealand as the future 
the world must have. The misleading claims of futurologists are 
exposed in both instances through empirical analyses of actual events. It 
is concluded that futurology is a deceptive, and therefore non-scientific, 
gaze which occludes social and natural contingency. 
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No More Imperial Cities: 
On Futurology in Social Science 
Brendan Gleeson 
There are two futures, the future of desire and the future of fate, and man s 
(sic) reason has never learnt to separate them. 
J.D. Bernal 
California is not what it was 
Rome too is not what it was 
No more imperial cities 
No more crazy societies 
Berlin, Vancouver, Samarkand 
Jean Baudrillard 
Leaving Los Angeles 
‘The seers of Los Angeles have become countless... ’7 
Who remembers Los Angeles? Of course, we all do — though perhaps 
now a little vaguely in the gloomy 1990s. But things were different in the 
heady 1980s when Southern California’s famous sun beamed its intoxicating 
light on all America — indeed, the world — and when it seemed all eyes 
were captivated by the brilliant glow of the state’s wondrously-brash 
megalopolis. Recall how Los Angeles was carolled by academics, cultural 
critics, politicians and the global media as the paradigmatic city of a new, 
Post-Fordist capitalism that would eventually overtake the globe. This 
anthem of praise was, of course, carefully orchestrated by local political and 
economic elites whose frequent exhortatory outpourings soon created a sea 
of self-admiration that many commentators and image-makers wallowed in. 
Typical of this self-applause was the city-sponsored manifesto, L.A 2000: A 
City for the Future (1988), whose authors were drawn from a carefully 
chosen cross-section of civic and corporate interests. The report gushed 
Soja (1989:223) 
shamelessly about the city's axial role in the coming millennium (for 
example ‘leading huh of world trade’), until climaxing with the cry that Los 
Angeles would be THE city of the 21st century’ (cited in Rieff, 1993:186 & 
23). This and earlier civic hyperbole was breathlessly matched by the 
global media and domestic and foreign social commentators, all of whom 
heaped significance (if not always praise) upon Los Angeles. 
The fascination with Los Angeles in the media and the academy is 
understandable (perhaps) if one recalls the popular 1980s assumption that 
the future of capitalism might be read in the city's myriad social and 
economic patterns. Many pundits from both spheres were convinced that 
Los Angeles was ‘the place where the American future might possibly be 
working itself out’ (Rieff, 1993:23). Like a crystal ball, Los Angeles was 
held up to the world gaze by the various media, and was frequently the 
setting for portentous films and books which predicted the future (not 
always optimistically) of global capitalism. Academics and artists were 
particularly entranced by a city which seemed to be the convergence point 
for an extraordinary array of human experiences and socio-cultural trends 
how often did one hear the jingle rejoicing that Los Angeles was ‘where 
it all comes together ? 
It was a popular nostrum of political and scientific opinion in the 1980s 
that Los Angeles would be a — or indeed, the — pivot of a new; ‘Pacific 
Century'. Geographers joined economists, cultural critics and politicians in 
a dawn chorus that heralded the birth of a new postmodern age of resurgent 
capitalism which would centre on the dynamic economies of the Pacific 
Rim. As Daly and Logan observe, the central claim of this carolling was 
that: 
the axis of the world was passing to the Pacific Basin. The next century, 
many agreed, would be the Pacific entry; it was inevitable. (1989: 2) 
Midway through the decade, the geographer, Ed Soja, intoned that 
‘securing the Pacific Rim has been the manifest destiny ot Los Angeles' 
(1986:257). Clearly moved by the significance fate had reserved tor Los 
Angeles, he lyricised on the grandeur of ‘the epitomising world city, une 
ville devenue monde' (1986:25)5). All. of course, was not harmony 
many discordant notes were heard from those who feared the depredations 
of this new ‘sweatshop’ capitalism and many scholarly and artistic depictions 
of Los Angeles focused on the city's spectacular maladies, including crime. 
poverty, racial and ethnic polarisation, and homelessness. Nonetheless a 
unifying refrain of the decade continued to proclaim the importance of Los 
Angeles in a new (Pacific Rim) world order. 
Of course the prophetic trance had its strongest hold within the city s own 
overlapping communities of business people, politicians, academics, 
journalists and image-makers — many of whom were variously enthralled 
and appalled with Los Angeles as a vision ol things to come. One political 
commentator, for example, warned that Los Angeles was ‘the theme city ol 
post-New Deal America’ (Meyerson, 1989:6). Others echoed this anxious 
warning about Los Angeles as the prototype Post-Welfare city. Rielf 
remembers that the city then seemed: 
a society made up almost entirely of true believers. They had found the 
future, no matter how much they might disagree about what that future was. 
They had found the dream. (1993:42) 
Whilst utopian and dystopian views of Los Angeles abounded, both Right 
and Left were united in believing it to be a paradigmatic city. Los Angeles 
had assumed point position in the march towards a Post-Fordist future. 
Rieff reminds us that, on the topic of Los Angeles at least. Right and Left 
were really denominations within a broader faith whose central article was 
the belief that ‘L.A.’s destiny would be grandiose...’ (1993:248). Indeed 
...even those who favored the Blade Runner scenario shared in this [belief] 
since what could have been more self-regarding, when all was said and done, 
than to insist that L.A. would be the only dystopia that mattered? (1993:248) 
As Davis points out, the prophetic significance of Los Angeles in social 
science was hardly an invention of the 1980s, and its genealogy can be 
traced to the writings of the Frankfurt School (and other) exiles who settled 
in Southern California during the 1930s. Brecht, for example, thought the 
city represented both heaven and hell, whilst Adorno and Horkheimer 
regarded it as the dark ‘crystal ball of capitalism’s future’ (Davis, 1990:48). 
Even then the gloomy significance which the German outcasts attached to 
Los Angeles found its mirror reflection in the cheery boosterism of 
business and civic lobbies. As early as 1923, a Chamber of Commerce 
publication had bragged that ‘...Los Angeles will become the world's leading 
city’ (cited in Rieff, 1993:186). But the prophetic sentiment was never 
more popular, nor more passionately felt, than in the feverish 1980s: 
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Los Angeles had always been a place where expansive rhetoric about the 
future was a commonplace of civic life, but even by that standard the (1980sJ 
mood was even more unconscionably upbeat than usual. (Rieff, 1993:23) 
Amongst local and (some foreign) social critics, a peculiarly Californian 
futurology emerged which seemed a fusion of the city’s traditional identity 
as the cinematic production house of the American dream and the 
increasingly prophetic mood of its political and intellectual elites. The 
future it seemed was a script being written in/by Los Angeles. Many social 
scientific essays on contemporary Los Angeles read like movie previews of 
what was to come in capitalism. Notwithstanding his own acute objections 
to the futurology which pervaded social and cultural criticism of Los 
Angeles, it must be said that Mike Davis' vividly dystopian (and often 
thrilling) depictions of the city had a certain cinematic ambience. His 
efforts to show us what the future should not be, sometimes had the feel of a 
Future Show: 
The city bristles with malice. The carefully manicured lawns of the Westside 
sprout ominous little signs threatening “Armed Response!” Wealthier 
neighbourhoods in the canyons and hillsides cower behind walls guarded by 
gun-toting private police and state-of-the-art electronic surveillance systems. 
Downtown, a publicly subsidized ‘urban renaissance’ has raised a forbidding 
corporate citadel, separated from the surrounding poor neighborhoods by 
battlements and moats...In cities like Los Angeles, on the hard edge of 
postmodernity, architecture and the police apparatus are being merged to an 
unprecedented degree...Los Angeles, as always in the vanguard, offers an 
especially disturbing guide to the emerging liaisons between urban 
architecture and the police state (emphasis added 1992:154-7). 
During the 1980s, an influential coterie of Los Angeles-based 
geographers, portrayed the city as a place of extraordinary significance, 
both as the meeting point of critical socio-spatial flows and the centre of 
many geographic regions (Davis, 1990; Gregory, 1994). At the end of the 
decade, Davis noted that the so-called ‘L.A. School': 
...have made clear that they see themselves as excavating the outlines of a 
paradigmatic postfordism, an emergent twenty-first century urbanism. 
(1990:84) 
In an already infamous declaration, Soja and Scott, appointed Los Angeles 
the ‘capital of the late 20th century* (1986:249). Elsewhere, Soja's political- 
4 
economic map of the Pac ific Rim had Los Angeles sharing with Tokyo the 
role of ‘capital of capital’ (1989a:21). Meanwhile, Dear and Wolch, 
lamented Los Angeles’ reputation as the US ‘capital of homelessness , but 
still uttered the hope that the city would in 2000 be the pre eminent 
metropolis of the First-World’ (1989:37). As Davis so acutely observed. 
By exposing the darkest facets of the ‘world city’...the L.A. School 
ridicules the utopias of L.A. 2000. Yet, by hyping Los Angeles as the 
paradigm of the future (even in a dystopian vein), they tend to collapse 
history into teleology and glamorize the very reality they would deconstruct. 
(1990:86) 
Geographers, of course, did not give themselves completely to 
futurology: the diversity and sophistication of their Los Angeles studies 
made too much room for contingency for that simple criticism to be true. 
Nonetheless, there was often a strong resonance of the city’s civic 
boosterism in the many analyses which assumed a paradigmatic, frequently 
global, significance for their empirical contexts. 
‘This centrifugal metropolis... ’ 2 
Many influential social critics came from other cities and abroad to pay 
homage to this apparition of the future which had settled on the central 
Californian coast. Fredric Jameson and Umberto Fco both paid tribute to 
the Mecca of a new postmodern age. Eco made an early (1976) pilgrimage 
to the manger of an infant(ile) civilisation — California, ‘where the 
posturban civilisation represented by Los Angeles is being born' (1987:26). 
One of the more fervent pilgrims was Jean Baudrillard, for whom there 
was ‘nothing to match flying over Los Angeles at night’ (1988:51). 
(Indeed, Baudrillard was not the only observer of the city whose rapture 
seemed to increase with altitude — recall the giddy prose of that other 
notable aerial survey of Los Angeles (Soja, 1986)). Baudrillard was utterly 
mesmerised by Los Angeles, and his hypnosis seemed a curious hybrid of 
scientific and aesthetic stimulation. In America , the vertiginous awe of his 
prose borders at times on stupefaction, revealing, perhaps, the intoxicating 
power of the city to render the (European) observer insensible with its 
immense complexity: 
2. Baudrillard (1988:58) 
5 
You will never have encountered anything that stretches as far as this before 
Even the sea cannot match it, since it is not divided up geometrically. The 
irregular, scattered flickering of European cities does not produce the same 
parallel lines, the same vanishing points, the same aerial perspectives either. 
They are medieval cities. This one condenses by night the entire future 
geometry of the networks of human relations, gleaming in their abstraction, 
luminous in their extension, astral in their reproduction to infinity. 
Mulholland Drive by night is an extraterrestial’s vantage-point on the 
Galactic metropolis, (emphasis added, 1988:52) 
Like some local producers of futurology, this foreign seer liked to work 
with film (‘...this town...is nothing more than an immense script and a 
perpetual motion picture’ (Baudrillard, 1983:26)): to see the future, one 
only had to sit back and watch the(ir) show. 
In the closing pages of America, Baudrillard further reflects on why Los 
Angeles was a place of compelling significance: 
Why is LA...so fascinating? It is because you are delivered from all depth 
there — a brilliant, mobile, superficial neutrality, a challenge to meaning and 
profundity, a challenge to nature and culture, an outer hyperspace, with no 
origin, no reference points. (1988:124) 
It was by California's warm shores that the world-weary, European critic 
could find repose, and even pleasure, in the society of infinite surfaces and 
depthlessness — a place where science, the difficult toil of wresting meaning 
from social contexts (work), appeared meaningless, if not impossible. 
Nonetheless one could luxuriate in the assurance that everything was so 
significant. 
Los Angeles, as Baudrillard observed, was certainly a centrifuge for 
social and aesthetic criticism in the 1980s. In 1986, Soja and Scott embraced 
the throng of ‘cultural critics, social and political analysts, theoretical human 
geographers, and others’ who had joined them to extol the significance of 
Los Angeles (1986:254). It was hard not to be impressed by this ensemble 
of notables and their infectious refrain: ‘It All Comes Together in Los 
Angeles' (Soja, 1989b). 
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Who Killed the Future? 
The choir of civic visionaries has now fallen strangely silent. The 1990s 
have not followed its prophetic score for Los Angeles — instead the city has 
succumbed to a combination of the depredatory effects of free and flexible- 
markets, the capricious global political-economy and ecological catastrophe. 
After a softening bombardment of federal military spending cutbacks from 
the late 1980s (Law et al, 1993), the city’s future finally detonated in a 
series of social and ecological implosions during the early 1990s (Johnson et 
al., 1993; Davis, 1995a). Los Angeles has survived its trial by recession 
(from 1989), riot (1992), fire (1993), earthquake (1994) and flood (1995) 
— but only just (see Davis, 1995a). The city is still shuddering from the 
economic and social aftershocks of these disasters — most critically, local 
state finances have deteriorated to the point of penury (indeed Orange 
County actually defaulted on its debt). In 1995 Wall Street threatened to 
downgrade Los Angeles' municipal bonds, forcing the County to 
contemplate a series of socially catastrophic spending cuts in order to avoid 
bankruptcy (Davis, 1995b). In announcing the planned cuts to vital public 
services, the County’s chief administrative officer observed that The age of 
miracles is over' (Davis, 1995b:76). Indeed, reality has bitten Los Angeles 
with ferocity — the barbarous caprices of mass society and nature seem to 
have sacked the ‘capital of the late 20th century’ of its rich destiny. Now 
both the global media and cultural critics appear rather reluctant to spotlight 
this tawdry, former star city. 
In social criticism it seems that the city's hinterland of significance has 
been radically reduced by its dramatic misfortunes. Like the famously 
callous international credit ratings agencies, many social commentators have 
responded to Los Angeles’ troubles with a sudden and cold-blooded 
downgrading of its global theoretical rating. Rieff’s recent depiction of Los 
Angeles, for example, abandons the view which was common during the 
1980s of the city as simultaneously developed and underdeveloped, the 
meeting point of the First and Third Worlds. He simply plots contemporary 
Los Angeles as the capital of the Third World' (1993). Davis argues that 
following the 1992 riots, the federal administration abandoned the ‘city of 
weary angels’ (1993b:54), after wearying itself of Los Angeles’ seemingly 
intractable socio-economic problems (1993a). Even before some of the 
more recent natural disasters, the urban theorists Friedman and Sandercock 
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pronounced that ‘Los Angeles is now a ravaged city, physically, 
economically and psychologically’ (1992:24). 
Los Angeles may be ravaged but it is not destroyed. The hard 
contemporary truth for the 1980s prophets is that both Armageddon and 
Abundance have never seemed further away from the city. Today Los 
Angeles is simply one of an increasing number of global cities that is 
struggling with the interlocking problems of public fiscal exhaustion, social 
polarisation and ecological degradation. 
In geography, the effervescence which marked certain commentaries a 
decade ago has subsided, and a new gravity prevails. The sobriety of Law et 
al. (1993) seems to capture the new mood of humility. They describe Los 
Angeles as ‘defense-less territory', a city devastated economically by the 
reductions in federal military spending. For them, the post-Cold War Los 
Angeles industrial landscape is far removed from the “‘brave new world" of 
a post-Fordist technopolis’ which the city’s economic geographers had 
imagined just a decade before (Law et al.., 1993:293). 
Elsewhere, many former prophets seem simply to have lapsed into a 
gloomy silence. Perhaps this hushed atmosphere in social commentary 
reflects a little embarrassment, a realisation that many were hypnotised 
during the 1980s by the whirling hype of the city’s hucksters. After a 
decade of luxuriant prediction, it seems that the prophets have fled leaving 
only a desert of wisdom. 
The New Zealand Miracle 
A Bad Moon Rising 
If capitalism’s celebrity city has disappointed its champions (and its 
critics) by failing to provide the future it promised, the yearning for a new' 
star has not lessened. But it seems that elsewhere, the story is not much 
better. Indeed, there is a gloomy perception that capitalism itself is in 
trouble: economic stagnation is undermining European political and 
economic integration, whilst also inflaming labour unrest and racial 
tensions; an explosive mix of gangster capitalism and resurgent ethnic and 
religious prejudices threatens the former Eastern Bloc countries; worsening 
social polarisation in the USA is encouraging both political extremism and 
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paralysis; Third World debt is reaching meltdown levels; whilst the Asian 
Tigers’ are consuming their own political and ecological habitats. Aspirants 
for the role of capitalist lodestar seem rather thin on the ground. 
But a restive audience is waiting: the capitalist world desperately needs a 
new vision and indeed there is lately a rising clamour that an image of a 
prosperous future has once again been sighted. Now neo-liberal prophets 
are rushing to tell the world of a new apparition, the ‘New Zealand 
miracle’. Word of this disturbing vision is also spreading in waves of alarm 
and dismay through international labour and social democratic networks. 
Thus the global oracular gaze is turning from the fading trail of Comet Los 
Angeles towards a brighter star in the now-unbroken, capitalist firmament. 
New prophetic hopes have been ignited at a surprisingly marginal point on 
the pacific Rim, New Zealand — heretofore a rather anonymous, outer tide 
mark of the British Empire, now numbering only one fifth of the population 
of greater Los Angeles. 
Flavour of the Month 
In recent years. New Zealand has added several distinctive offerings to 
global trade markets, such as its popular ‘Hokey Pokey' ice-cream — a 
unique mixture ot vanilla confection and butterscotch crunch. Another 
export success has been the ‘New Zealand Miracle’, a sort of rhetorical 
version ot the ice-cream, a rich blend of honeyed financial success stories 
that can supposedly be attributed to the country’s neo-liberal reform 
program ot the past decade. The ‘New Zealand Miracle is the trademark 
which has been used by local and overseas promoters to sell this neo-liberal 
reform package — or ‘Structural Adjustment Programme’ (SAP) — to 
other national governments and global financial institutions. What is the 
SAP product that we are being urged to buy? 
James (1992) and Kelsey (1995) provide thoroughgoing reviews of the 
SAP, both describing it as a comprehensive restructuring of New Zealand’s 
public sector and economy that began with the election of a reformist 
Labour government in 1984 and which has continued to the present day. 
Castle and Haworth (1993) explain that the SAP has been carefully 
engineered by a powerful set of bureaucrats (notably in the Treasury), 
politicians and business interests who set out in the early 1980s to transform 
New Zealand’s debt-ridden welfare state along neo-liberal lines. Other 
commentators have compared this neo-liberal front to the New Right lobbies 
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in the USA and Britain (see, for example, Forer (1995)). McLoughlin 
(1992) describes New Zealand's neo-liberalism as a ‘cargo cult’, led by local 
elites who have encouraged an extraordinary political devotion to Chicago 
School economics. 
In brief, the key features of the SAP have been a radical reduction in 
government spending and regulation, corporatisation and privatisation of 
state assets and functions, trade liberalisation and labour market 
deregulation. Besides deregulating the productive and financial sectors of 
the economy, the reforms have been comprehensive in scope — including 
central and local government administration, environmental planning, 
education and social services. The dominance of the ideology of the market 
place, a search for efficiency in resource use, and the influence of senior 
neo-liberal Treasury officials have been hallmarks of the SAP (Holland and 
Boston, 1990). 
The results of the SAP have been mixed, a fact not apparent (or 
convenient) to the New Zealand state and business elites which have 
pronounced the ‘experiment’ a resounding success. Nonetheless, a selective 
review of the more positive economic indicators of recent years makes 
cheery reading for neo-liberals and exasperated governments with sluggish 
economies. Public sector debt has been reduced — from 51 percent of GDP 
in 1992 to 38 percent in 1995, with projections for further falls — whilst 
the government has since 1994 been able to run impressive budget surpluses 
after a succession of deficits in earlier years (estimated surplus for 1995- 
1996 of $2.49 billion) (Kelsey, 1995). Since 1993, GDP growth has been 
strong (5 percent in 1994-1995) whilst inflation has remained low by OECD 
standards since the early 1990s. Perceived ‘rigidities' in labour markets 
(i e. unions, centralised arbitration and national awards covering salaries 
and working conditions) have been dispensed with or reduced. Job growth 
revived in 1993 and by June 1995 the official jobless rate stood at a ‘mere' 
6.3 percent. 
Of course, as Easton and Gerritsen (1996) explain, the recovery' in the 
economy and state finances in recent years has yet to compensate the country 
properly for the seven years of economic stagnation and social 
fragmentation which the SAP imposed on New Zealanders. Many key 
economic indicators, such as public debt, are just now returning to their 
pre-1984 levels (Easton, 1994). Moreover, there are increasing signs that 
the recovery is already faltering and that recession looms in the near luture. 
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But it seems that both this perspective view of the ‘recovery’ and the 
increasingly bleak economic outlook cannot dull the lustre ol the ‘New 
Zealand Miracle’. The SAP now has powerful international advocates — in 
the form of international finance media, influential economists and global 
institutions, such as the OECD and the World Bank — who have much 
political capital invested in the New Zealand product. 
The ‘New Zealand Miracle’ is an international success story which is 
steadily attaining the status of popular non(?)fiction in global finance and 
governance circles —just read the plaudits and testimonies from (neo¬ 
liberal) critics on the back cover: the OECD (1994) praises the ‘recovery' 
which had to follow years of sensible but painful reform, whilst the 
powerful international credit ratings agency Moody’s Investors Services 
enthuses on ‘one of the most ambitious and comprehensive structural 
reforms undertaken by any OECD country' which had set in place a 
‘virtuous cycle' of self-adjusting growth (cited in Kelsey, 1995:7). The 
influential Geneva-based World Economic Eorum has proclaimed New 
Zealand the ‘new star' of the global, competitive economy (The Australian 
Financial Review, 30.5.96:6). Some of the least restrained tributes have 
come from the Economist which has repeatedly congratulated ‘the most 
thoroughgoing economic reform in the OECD' for creating ‘a paradise for 
free-marketeers — if not for those New Zealanders who have lost their 
jobs’ (cited in Kelsey, 1995:8). As Forer (1995) and Kelsey (1995) report, 
the Economist's enthusiasm was matched by the Wall Street Journal, 
Toronto’s Globe and Mail and Britain's Times and Financial Times. Many 
ol the major Australian newspapers - notably The Australian and The 
Australian Financial Review — have also been tireless cheerleaders for the 
SAP. 
Nowhere have the economic prescriptions of Chicago School economists 
been more vigorously pursued in a developed country than in New Zealand 
(Elaworth, 1994; Whitwell, 1990), and neo-liberal pundits and institutions 
are anxious to see the experiment proclaimed a success and the SAP 
treatment generalised to other Western countries. Hence, the guardians of 
the global economy are increasingly heralding the New Zealand SAP path as 
the only way forward for stagnant advanced capitalist economies. Indeed, 
the trumpeting ol New Zealand’s ‘turnaround economy’ has a familiar 
prophetic tone to it. The Economist, for example, insists that the SAP is a 
set of ‘trail blazing reforms’ which provides other Western nations with a 
recipe for economic revival (cited in Kelsey, 1995:8). The World 
Economic Forum assures us that New Zealand's reforms ‘will he widely 
studied and emulated in future years’ (The Australian Financial Review, 
30.5.96:6). 
In 1993, the head of New Zealand's Business Roundtable, a powerful 
junta of corporate interests, observed that countries with large public 
sectors, such as Canada, Sweden and Germany, ‘have become detached from 
reality’ and would be soon overtaken by economic crisis (Otago Daily 
Times, 16.10.93:34). Their only salvation, he claimed, lay in the immediate 
adoption of the SAP. Delusions of grandeur flourished as the ‘recovery’ 
deoxygenated the country’s political (and intellectual) atmosphere. In 1993, 
the state produced its own version of the LA 2000 report — the Asia 2000 
strategy — which plots a fabulous economic destiny for New Zealand within 
the new Asian ascendancy. Sound familiar? 
But there is an important difference between the prophetic interest in 
New Zealand and that futurology which fixed on Los Angeles a decade ago. 
No-one is saying that New Zealand will be the centre of the new world 
capitalist system, as many did for the Pacific Rim and its cities. (Although 
the immodest political cant of New Zealand’s ruling elites often shies just 
short of this fantastic claim.) Unlike the Los Angeles vision, the New 
Zealand image does not conjure an inevitable geographic re-centring of the 
world and the diffusion of proto-typical economic and cultural forms. 
Whereas Los Angeles was held to preview the inevitable — i.e. future as 
place — the New Zealand Miracle is an explicitly normative vision. It is 
not the divining vision of where things will go, but rather the revelation 
from-on-high of how things should be; viz., place as exemplar. New 
Zealand is the set of tablets, come down from the mount of economic 
wisdom. (Although the Left will groan that these same desiderata have in 
the past made many descents from many mountains.) For its champions. 
New Zealand's SAP is a prescription of hard economic medicine that must 
be followed if capitalist countries are to regain growth and fiscal health. 
.Thus, the New Zealand path is not cast as inevitable by its advocates; 
rather they explain the SAP as a course that can only be taken through 
dramatic political choice by nation states. However, it must be said that the 
model’s neo-liberal champions see the SAP as the very embodiment of 
reason. Thus the quasi-religious faith of neo-liberals in ‘rational choice' as 
a universal human trait encourages the model’s advocates to identify New 
Zealand's SAP with the future of capitalism. On the other hand, the almost 
universal political pessimism of the Left nourishes a similar, but 
melancholic, sense of destiny. 
However, as with Los Angeles, the increasing significance accorded to 
New Zealand in international theoretical and policy realms derives from 
both critical (i.e. Left) and laudatory (i.e. Right) interpretations. Critics 
fear that New Zealand’s recent history indeed foretells the increasingly 
impoverished futures of advanced capitalist societies. Thus, a throng of 
non-believers and apostates are now journeying to foreign lands, attempting 
to counter the global media’s idolatry of the SAP by arguing that the ‘New 
Zealand miracle’ is a vision of doom, not prosperity. Not unreasonably, 
they fear its emulation in the rest of the advanced capitalist world (the 
World bank has already imposed a similar model of adjustment on many 
developing countries). 
One outspoken critic of the SAP, Auckland Law Professor, Jane Kelsey, 
has, for example, warned Australians against adopting the reform model in 
several well-publicised public lectures in that country (see The Canberra 
Times, 26.2.96:13). In February 1995, New Zealand's Association of Non- 
Government Organisations (ANGO) released internationally a report 
countering the glowing account of the SAP which the government had 
delivered to the United Nations World Summit for Social Development in 
Copenhagen. The ANGO report aimed to tell the world ‘the story of 10 
years ol social dislocation that the New Zealand official report ignores' 
(Kelsey & O'Brien, 1995:i). For several years, leading New Zealand 
unionists have been warning labour organisations in other countries about 
the dire consequences for workers of the SAP. 
But there are reasons to doubt that the hopes and fears of champions and 
critics alike will be realised. There are reasons to believe that, like Los 
Angeles, New Zealand will disappoint any belief that it provides a ready 
preview of the global future. For, as will shortly be shown, the New 
Zealand created by the neo-liberal revolution of the past decade is an 
unstable and rapidly fragmenting society which cannot provide the 
convincing global model of change so desired by the Right and so feared by 
the Left. 
It is probably impossible to convince neo-liberals that the ‘New Zealand 
Miracle is just a mirage which will evaporate in time, as the reality of the 
SAP’s contradictions and failures becomes more apparent. It may be just as 
haid to reassure the Lett that the SAP is not a new world patent for social 
misery, even though the reforms have clearly devastated New Zealand 
society. The obstinate belief in New Zealand as utopia/dystopia across the 
political spectrum seems to derive from a common myopia, or more 
precisely, a failure to examine the detailed consequences of the SAP. A 
closer look at the facts reveals that the model is disintegrating, and may not 
survive attempts to secure its generalisation. 
The Devil is in the Details 
Honey / Shrank the Economy 
The first period of the SAP (1984-1990), overseen by two Labour 
governments, saw economic growth slow to a near standstill (Wilkes & 
OBrien, 1994; Roper, 1993). In the first few years after its election (1990), 
the National government imposed a recessionary macroeconomic regime on 
the country through dramatic public spending cuts (Dalziel, 1992). In 1991 
the New Zealand economy shrank by two percent. Although the economy 
has been expanding since 1992, the country has still not regained its 1985- 
1986 growth levels. The SAP actually reduced growth for much of the 
reform era: in the period 1985-1992, OECD economies in total expanded by 
20 percent whilst New Zealand's economy shrank by one percent (Easton & 
Gerritsen, 1996; OECD, 1993). In 1994 the economist, Easton, 
characterised the SAP as a decade of lost growth, which the post-1993 
recovery could not restore to New Zealand (Easton, 1994). 
Now New Zealand's ‘turnaround economy' seems to be turning on its 
owners and trainers: the much feted ‘recovery' of 1994 appears to have 
gone before it really got going. Several critical macro indicators have been 
in decline since early 1995 and the consensus view of economists is that a 
major recession is imminent {The New Zealander, 8.5.96:21). GDP growth 
is plummeting: by December 1995, the annual growth rate had slumped to 
just over half (3.5 percent) the 1994 level (6.3 percent). In early 1996, both 
government and private sector economists were forecasting continuing 
decline, with the Treasury gloomily predicting a growth rate of just 1.5 
percent by mid-year (The Australian, 9.4.96:6). Private sector economists 
argue that the economy is slowing at an even faster rate (The Australian 
Financial Review, 29.3.96:23). The decline in growth has seriously eroded 
company profits, business confidence and job creation (The Independent. 
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19.4.96:8). Accordingly, the government now expects a rise in the 
unemployment rate to nearly seven percent in 1997 (many observers regard 
this as a conservative estimate). 
A key feature of the SAP was the Reserve Bank Act 1989 which limited 
the Bank to the sole objective of pursuing ‘price stability’ in the economy. 
Since 1990, the government has defined ‘price stability as an annual 
inflation rate between zero and two percent. By 1993 it appeared that the 
Bank had discharged its sole responsibility to the nation with the economy 
registering an inflation rate of just 1.5 percent (Kelsey, 1995). However, 
the post-1992 ‘recovery’ saw rising pressure on prices: in 1995 a mild panic 
erupted amongst the financial community following the release ot June 
quarter figures indicating an annual inflation rate of 4.6 percent. Almost a 
year later, the Bank’s governor was forced to admit that inflation was still 
above its target range and would likely remain so for the rest of the year 
(The Independent, 26.4.96:30). 
The systemic contradictions in the SAP model were further exposed as the 
consequences of prolonged reductions in infrastructure investment, skills 
training and industrial research, took their toll on economic activity. 
Another serious threat to growth emerged in 1995-1996 as the Reserve 
Bank tightened monetary conditions in an (unsuccessful) effort to bottle the 
inflationary genie. High interest rates and an appreciating currency drained 
growth from the economy, and competitiveness from its producers, without 
bringing inflation back within the target range. The export sector bled 
heavily through 1995: in the year to February 1996, the country recorded a 
balance of trade deficit of $NZ860 million; a stark reversal of the previous 
year’s $NZ507 surplus. At the same time, the balance of payments went 
into disastrous decline with New Zealand ending 1995 with a current 
account deficit of NZ$3.8 billion. The peak national rural lobby, Federated 
Farmers, suspected that even this colossal deficit was an underestimate and 
accused the government of ‘cooking its books’ in order to conceal a much 
larger current account problem {Otago Daily Times, 16.4.96:11). By 1996, 
the external sector was still deteriorating with the Treasury predicting that 
the current account deficit would burgeon to an alarming 5.2 percent of 
GDP by 1998. 
Some blamed the worsening external situation on the privatisation and 
uncontrolled foreign investment which had been central features of the SAP. 
By 1996, some 54 percent of shares on the New Zealand stock exchange 
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were overseas owned (compared with 19 percent in 1989) (The Australian 
Financial Review, 5.1.96:8), and the left leaning Alliance party argued that 
‘higher earning by foreign companies have...contributed to the deficit’ 
(Alliance, 1996:2 ). Others saw the Reserve Bank Act as largely to blame, 
given that the Bank’s relentless pursuit of inflation had rapidly undermined 
the fragile, post-1992 recovery. As the Council of Trade Unions economist, 
Peter Harris, observed angrily: 
We were told that the reward of price stability was economic growth. But 
now economic growth has to be reined in because it threatens price stability, 
(cited in Kelsey, 1995:170) 
Kelsey argues that, nearly twelve years after its dramatic inception, the 
SAP has left New Zealand locked in a ‘growth/recession merry-go-round’ 
(1995:169). The ‘lean and mean' economy which the SAP's architects had 
deliberately set out to construct is proving leaner and more vulnerable than 
anticipated. Deregulation has left New Zealand especially exposed to the 
vagaries of the global economy: the country’s critical rural sector has been 
especially damaged by a combination of the free-floating (and overvalued) 
dollar and plummeting commodity prices {The New Zealander, 8.5.96:21). 
Just as worryingly, the economy’s main growth pole — international 
tourism — was flagging by early 1996, as other countries jostled for the 
‘clean and green' travellers’ market {Otago Daily Times, 1 1.5.1996:16). 
Even the model’s long time friends appear to be wearying of its failure to 
deliver the long promised ‘pain from gain’. In an extraordinary outburst, 
the President of the neo-liberal Federated Farmers compared the New 
Zealand economy in April 1996 to Mexico's shortly before that country's 
recent disastrous economic collapse (Otago Daily Times, 16.4.96:1 1). 
Further confirmation of the troubles ahead came from a surprising source 
when the OECD, a long term enthusiast of the SAP, predicted in early 1996 
that New Zealand would have the worst current account deficit in the 
Western world by 1997 (The Age, 10.2.96:13). By June 1996, New 
Zealand’s net external debt (private and public) had reached 65 percent of 
CiDP, the highest of any developed economy (The Press, 31.5.96:17). 
An end of term report card for the SAP confirms two achievements. The 
economy is evidently (and dangerously) lean, and there is no denying that 
the reforms have also delivered a meaner New Zealand society. 
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From Godzone to Warzone 
During the 1990s, the country's newly-commercialised media has 
attempted to conjure support for a new national bonding myth — the ideal 
of ‘Team New Zealand ‘ — through sporting hype characterised by an 
increasingly aggressive braggadocio. But in spite of several notable 
international sporting triumphs, the off-field performance of the campaign 
has lagged: Team New Zealand is deeply divided, and \shellshocked from 
change’ (James, 1992:5). Many people imagine a happier time when things 
were different, when it seemed that New Zealand was the Blessed Country, 
which translated in lazy Antipodean English as ‘Godzone'. 
The ‘Godzone myth’ enshrines the image of a lost New Zealand — a 
peaceful, egalitarian society, where the common ills of developed nations 
— high crime, poverty, pollution, racial conflict — were as remote as the 
outside world itself (James, 1992; McLoughlin, 1992). There is something 
of the rural idyll in this misty eyed image of New Zealand as an Arcadia of 
natural abundance where people lived uncomplicated and tranquil lives. The 
society of Godzone was an intimate and harmonious one, governed by the 
cultural norms of mutual support and obligation, a legacy of the country’s 
hardy British settlers of the nineteenth-century. The tale of Godzone then 
relates how these pioneer norms of mutuality and equality were codified 
during the 1930s in the world's first Welfare State, which eventually 
established the most extensive network of social support in the English 
speaking world. Social security was guaranteed both by a high level of 
organic solidarity and a caring state. 
Several observers have argued that the rich embroidery of the Godzone 
ideal has blanketed the long history of violence, land dispossession and social 
underdevelopment suffered by the country’s indigenous peoples — the 
Maori — since the colonial era (see for example Spoonley et al, 1991). 
Others (see, for example Bedggood, 1980; Wilkes, 1994) have debunked the 
cherished notion of Godzone as a classless society, by demonstrating the 
existence of both a sizeable proletariat and an impoverished social stratum 
since white settlement. Whilst these and other criticisms of the Godzone 
myth are certainly justified, it is nonetheless true that, prior to 1984, New 
Zealand society was relatively consensual and insular, at least by 
international standards. Forer (1995:251) characterises pre-1984 New 
Zealand as ‘a notably caring and personal society’. Twelve years of SAP 
have changed all that. 
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Public sector restructuring has been, and remains, a critical focus of the 
SAP. Since 1984, dramatic ‘reforms’ to all facets of the public sector have 
aimed to reduce the putative dependency of individual New Zealanders on 
the state. Generally, this restructuring has involved fiscal cutbacks, 
restricting entitlement to social support, a shift to regressive, indirect 
taxation, user charges for public services, reductions in benefit levels, and 
the corporatisation (and in many cases privatisation) of many state health, 
education, housing and welfare functions (see Kelsey & O'Brien (1995) and 
the collection edited by Boston & Dalziel (1992) for a comprehensive 
overview of these reforms). The ‘slash and burn' public sector 
restructuring reached its zenith with the National government's 1991 
‘mother of all budgets' which drastically reduced the levels of benefits paid 
to the unemployed, the ill. and solo parents. The cuts ranged in severity 
from hurtful to malicious: the young persons unemployment payment, for 
example, was slashed by a whopping 25 percent in real terms. The 1991 
reductions consolidated, albeit dramatically, the cuts to welfare entitlements 
which had been initiated by the previous, post-1984 Labour governments. 
Kelsey comments that the 1991 budget ‘formalised the stratification of New 
Zealand society which Labour had begun' (1995:273). 
The SAP also attacked the corporatist-welfare model on another critical 
front by deregulating labour relations. The Employment Contracts Act 
1991 entirely swept away the inherited system of centralised arbitration and 
wage-fixing and replaced it with a liberalised, contracts-based labour market 
that drastically reduced the authority and role of unions in workplace 
bargaining. The government's gift to capital had sudden and gratifying 
results: union membership declined rapidly after 1991, wages and working 
conditions were eroded and job insecurity heightened. The sustained decline 
in average real earnings since 1991 has been matched by wage dispersion, 
further exacerbating social stratification (ACOSS-ACTU Study Program, 
1996). 
The restructuring of New Zealand's state sector and labour markets has 
reduced living standards for many (St John, 1994). Indeed. O'Brien and 
W ilkes (1993) refer to the SAP as a ‘pauperisation policy'. Levels ot 
immiseration have risen sharply: government-funded research in 1996 
concluded that one in five New Zealanders lived in poverty- (Otago Daily 
Times, 12.4.96:3). The same study estimated that nearly one-third ot New 
The estimate was based on a poverty line of 60 percent of median household, 
disposable income. 
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Zealand children lived below the poverty line. Another poverty barometer, 
demand for charitable assistance — has measured a shocking rise in penury'. 
By 1994, the Auckland urban area had 130 food banks fa relatively new 
phenomenon in New Zealand; which were distributing around 5000 parcels 
a month to the desperate — 10 times more than in 1990 (Otago Daily 
Times, 15.9.94:3;. In the south island city of Dunedin, one major welfare 
agency reported in 1995 a 1000 percent increase in the number of food 
parcels disbursed over the previous six years (Otago Daily Times, 
11.9.95:4;. 
There is increasing evidence of the heretofore-foreign evil of ‘working 
poverty’ in contemporary Newr Zealand. A recent Salvation Army survey 
of food bank users found that nearly 31 percent were employed — in some 
regions the figure w'as 20 percent. The Labour Minister shrugged off the 
survey results, remarking simply that ‘some jobs aren't worth much' (Otago 
Daily Times, 24.1.96:10;. Some private sector potentates were more 
helpful. In response to reports from teachers of growing hunger amongst 
younger pupils, the vice-chairman of the Business Roundtable urged schools 
to establish sandwich making classes for parents in order to 'improve the 
provisioning of children coming to school' (Otago Daily Times, 26.3.94:4;. 
In early 1995, Britain's Joseph Rowntree Foundation released an 
authoritative study on changes in national income inequality for 18 
developed countries during the 1980s. According to this study, New 
Zealand recorded the greatest increase in income inequality in the study 
period, outpacing even the United States, and the United Kingdom (Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. 1995;. Rankin (1995; also reports data which also 
show a dramatic increase in income inequality in New Zealand since 1984. 
Even the Economist concluded in 1994 that the gap between rich and poor 
in New Zealand had become one of the highest in the world (Otago Daily 
Times, 9.1 1.94.:36;. Rather worryingly for the SAP advocates, the 
Economist opined that income inequality might actually stifle economic 
growth. But the government remained unflappable, not to say cavalier, in 
the face of rising evidence that the SAP was tearing New Zealand society 
apart. Revealing an extraordinarily callous outlook, the Finance Minister 
quipped in March 1995 that widening income inequality ‘doesn't worry me’ 
(Otago Daily Times, 16.3.95.1;. But it will. 
A range of morbidity and social dysfunction indicators are signalling a 
potentially explosive malaise in New Zealand's society. The SAP reforms 
have created both an increasingly marginalised stratum of poor, 
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unemployed, unhealthy and underhoused people and a flourishing 
underground economy. Convictions for violent crime increased by an 
astonishing 50 percent between 1982-1991 (Kelsey, 1995). In 1994, a study 
by Britain’s Home Office concluded that New Zealanders were more likely 
to be victims of crime than people in any other industrialised nation (Otago 
Daily runes, 22.4.96:3). Unemployment and rising racial tensions fuelled 
the rise of violent youth and ethnic gangs, many of whom had sophisticated 
connections both to the alternative economy and foreign criminal 
associations, such as Asian Triads. By 1996, there were an estimated 70 
major youth and ethnic gangs, with a combined membership of around 
1 1,000, and the popular perception was that the problem was out of hand 
(7he Canberra limes, 19.5.96:9). Police statements did not help to calm 
public fears: in May the Police Commssioner admitted that his force was 
‘close to losing control of gang crime’ (The Press, 31.5.96:1). Authorities 
attempted desperate measures — such as town curfews — to counter gang 
violence as politicians and the popular press wailed about the new ‘youth 
menace’. Amidst the rising national hysteria in mid-1996, gang 
representatives provided some of the few rational evaluations of the 
problem by pinpointing the SAP as the source of youth alienation and racial 
tension. The spokesman for the theatrically-named ‘Mongrel Mob' knew 
precisely what his greatest recruiting aid was: 
...gangs are a social barometer. All of a sudden, over a 10-year period . 
you've had a phenomenal increase in gang membership, and that reflects 
what society is going through. (The Canberra Times, 19.5.96:9) 
These sentiments were echoed by the spokesman for the rival Black 
Power gang who argued provocatively that *the only crime being committed 
in this country is by the Government' (The Canberra Times, 19.5.96:9). 
The dramatic increases in suicide rates during the SAP era have also 
highlighted social distress: 
Between 1974 and 1990 the rate of male suicide has risen by 288 percent, 
with the greatest increase in the late 1980s. In 1990 New Zealand had the 
highest rate of suicide for 15 to 24-year-old women in the OEC I), and the 
third-highest rate for young men. (Kelsey. 1995: 295) 
The corporatisation of public health has seen, inter alia, the levying of 
user charges for basic services and skyrocketing prescriptions fees 
(Fougere, 1994). The result has been reduced access to primary health care 
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for the burgeoning poor (Otago Daily Times, 5.9.952), and the chilling 
reappearance in New Zealand of diseases of poverty, such as rickets, 
tuberculosis and scurvy (Kelsey & O’Brien, 1995). 
Maori and Pacific Islands immigrants have borne the brunt of the SAP. 
In particular, Maori have lost resources to privatisation, jobs to industrial 
restructuring, and public benefits to state cutbacks. In December 1993, one 
third of Maori youth were unemployed, and almost two-fifths of Maori 
children lived in households in the lowest 20 percent of income (Kelsey, 
1995). Maori also fared far worse than the non-Maori on most other 
negative indicators, such as teenage pregnancy, benefit dependency, and 
suicide. By April 1995, unemployment amongst Pacific Islands immigrants 
was just over 21 percent (Sunday Star-Times, 30.4.95:A4). 
Contemporary New Zealand is for Spoonley (1994:93) Two-nations’ that 
are ‘sharply differentiated along Polynesian/Non-Polvnesian lines'. As 
Kelsey (1995) explains, many Maori see the SAP in neo-colonial terms, as 
an intensification of the process of dispossession, poverty and alienation that 
has operated since white settlement in 1840. The extremity of Maori 
alienation is nurturing a new, and highly militant, politics amongst New7 
Zealand’s indigenous peoples. An increasingly influential and radical 
stratum of younger Maori leaders is demanding complete sovereignty for 
their people. Tensions between Maori and non-Maori were inflamed in 
1995 during a series of dramatic occupations of land and buildings by 
indigenous peoples. As Kelsey explains. The occupations represented a 
potent threat to the new economy’ by undermining the security of property 
rights and thus alarming investors. In 1996, Maori anger at the reform 
legacy continues to simmer as foreboding grows amongst social 
commentators: Trotter (1995) essays the possibility of a violent Maori-led 
revolution in New Zealand, whilst Kelsey (1995:322) is not prepared to 
discount ‘outright rebellion against the state’ in the near future. The 
sociologist, Shirley, makes the following pessimistic assessment of the SAP’s 
socio-political legacy: 
Within our dual society we have established an underclass which no longer 
has a vested interest in democracy or in democratic institutions and as a 
consequence we should not be surprised if those ostracised from the 
mainstream of New Zealand life willingly promote its destruction, (cited in 
Kelsey, 1995:296) 
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In spite of heightening social fragmentation and conflict, one political 
ideal continues to unite a majority of New Zealanders — the abandonment 
of the SAP. Indeed, ever since the reforms were initiated a majority of 
voters have opposed the SAP, but this resistance has been checked by the 
duplicity of the major parties, an anti-democratic ‘First-Past-the-Posf (FPP) 
electoral system and the breathtaking, ‘crash through' strategy of the 
reformists (James, 1992). The record of both Labour and National in 
breaking election promises to slow or halt the SAP, and the blitzkrieg 
approach to implementation, rapidly eroded the New Zealand public’s trust 
in its electoral system and politicians. (A mid-year poll in 1992 showed that 
an astonishing 81 percent of voters believed that corruption existed in New' 
Zealand politics (Kelsey, 1995).) 
In 1993 the people responded by voting out the entire electoral structure 
in a national referendum which replaced the FPP system with one based on 
proportional representation. The first national election under the new 
system is to be held in October 1996, and it is likely that a combination of 
parties opposed to key elements of the SAP (including a recentred Labour 
party) will form the next government. Indeed, Forer (1995:258) describes 
the new electoral system as ‘the final curtain on radical economic 
restructuring’. The pre-election run-up has been marked by the spectacular 
rise in polls of the kNew Zealand First Party', a populist newcomer whose 
charismatic leader has successfully tapped into rising ethnic tensions and 
voter antipathy for key elements of the SAP, such as privatisation and direct 
foreign investment {The Independent, 19.4.96:8). Already a host of neo¬ 
liberal cadres, ranging from industry representatives, and international 
finance journalists, to credit ratings agents, are warning that ‘electoral 
instability' (i.e. the political rejection of the SAP) will bring dire 
consequences for the New Zealand economy (see, for example The 
Australian Financial Review, 9.5.96:13 and the editorial in The Australian, 
1 1.4.96:1 1)). 
Would You Like the Recipe? 
T he New Zealand Miracle is fast becoming just another parable of 
capitalist restructuring. The SAP's significance beyond New Zealand is 
rapidly diminishing with the model increasingly immobilised by internal 
contradictions and the contingencies of place. Popular antipathy is about to 
overtake the SAP as the new electoral system finally places the model within 
political reach of the majority — and there are signs that other polities will 
reject the SAP formula in pure form. Already one market — the Australian 
electorate — has refused to buy the Kiwi product. In 1993, the conservative 
Australian Liberal Party attempted to win national office with a thinly 
disguised, re-packaged version of the SAP (‘Fightback!’) but was rejected by 
voters in spite of the deep incumbency problems of the Labour government. 
In 1996 the Liberal Party finally won office after carefully distancing 
itself from the extremities of the New Zealand model. However, with 
breathtaking duplicity, the new federal government promptly undertook a 
series of neo-liberal measures, including severe budget cuts and the "reform' 
of virtually all public sectors activities (notably, welfare and industrial 
relations). At the time of writing (September, 1996), several key elements 
of the new government’s reform agenda were stalled in the national 
legislature's upper chamber (the Senate). Moreover, there were increasing 
signs that many state governments (all but one of which was conservative) 
would resist aspects of the federal reforms (especially the plan to introduce 
New Zealand style changes to public housing). It was clear that the 
variegated politics of Australian federalism would seriously hinder any 
attempt to reproduce the SAP in Australia. 
Meanwhile other national electorates — for example Britain, France, 
Sweden, Italy and the USA — seem deeply wary of neo-liberal politics. 
Even the prophets are now waking from their dreams. One of the chief US 
apostles of 1980s neo-liberalism, Stephen S. Roach (the ‘guru of 
downsizing’), made a spectacular political about-face in 1996 and now 
advises a quasi-interventionism for governments (Roach, 1996). At the 
same time, Francis Fukuyama, author of the famous eulogy for (non¬ 
capitalist) ideology, is having second thoughts about the social viability of 
free-market capitalism (Fukuyama, 1995). 
All this is not to say that the New Zealand experiment won't influence 
political economic change in the developed world. The ‘preliminary results’ 
have already impressed the guardians of the global economy and have 
doubtless affected national restructuring policies elsewhere. But there is 
nothing so unpopular, nor so historically expendable, as an experiment that 
simply didn't work. And increasingly the empirical evidence from 
laboratory New Zealand suggests an experiment racked by unanticipated 
results and reversals. Whitwell (1990:108) characterises the SAP as a failed 
appeal to an old orthodoxy’, and it seems certain that history will footnote 
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the New Zealand experiment as just another isolated application of the age 
old laissez-faire model. 
From the Prophets Deserts Come... 
The future’, as Althusser observed, ‘lasts a long time’: much longer it 
seems than the shelf lives of social prophesies. Indeed, the intemperance of 
human and natural events seems to spoil even the most durable prophecy 
beyond any value to social science. The ‘epitomizing future city’ of the 
1980s is the battered Los Angeles of today, struggling to overcome the 
universal problems of economic globalisation, social disintegration and 
ecological degradation. Already the New Zealand Miracle seems destined to 
join the rich record of political cargo cults that have flourished since the 
birth of capitalism. 
What is at issue? Not speculation on what is to come — that modest 
practice is surely a grand hope of social science (cf. Driver, 1993). Indeed, 
informed and rigorously-debated speculation is a politicising duty of social 
science. Rather, the problem essayed here has been the tendency in social 
science and cultural criticism for futurology — viz., the conviction that the 
future already exists here in the concrete present. Futurology is thus the 
ultimate trivialisation of history and social science — to know the future is 
to make it inescapable, to record this is to utter prophecy that wearily waits 
for fulfilment. Indeed, futurology could be described as a variant of 
positivism — seers always cloak their desires with the mantle of 
inevitability, and prophecy is very often the aggrandisement of place or 
moment. 
This is not to say that members of the LA. School', for example, ever 
claimed to be seers, nor would it be fair to characterise the entirety, or even 
the majority, of their comprehensive analyses as futurology. Rather, as 
Davis (1990) himself pointed out, there was a tendency tor their work to 
inflate the wider significance of its empirical context, thus unwittingly 
affirming the hype of local political and civic boosters. There is the same 
danger pervading the many insightful, critical analyses ot the New Zealand 
Miracle. Kelsey's (1993) exhaustive account of the SAP, tor example, 
portrays the contradictions inherent in the model without addressing their 
(already demonstrated) potential to undermine the viability ot the reform 
program, both in New Zealand and abroad. Thus her work lends subtle 
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support to the inflated claims to global significance ot the SAP’s neo-liberal 
advocates. 
Like positivism, the tendency for futurology is dangerous for its capacity 
to depoliticise science and must be opposed for this. If we already know the 
future, then all hope of shaping social events seems lost. Leached of our 
agency, we are reduced to playing our pre-ordained parts in the social 
drama which we know as prophecy, be it utopian or dystopian. But who 
writes the script? And for what personal and social ends? Certainly, 
scientific fatalism can never serve the cause of social democracy, which is 
the debate over what future we must choose and struggle for. 
Of course, the future is of critical scientific interest: but the future must 
always be the ground of critical debate; indeed, the leitmotif of 
contemporary politics. Critical speculation on what is to come, on what 
should be struggled for, is the keystone of a politically-engaged science. 
Futurology, by contrast, surrenders this political duty to the reactionary 
authority of prophesy. 
Social scientists must resist the temptation to adopt or reflect the 
perspective of the booster or doomsayer. Futurology is a deceptive gaze 
that conveniently occludes social and natural contingency, offering instead 
appealing visions that relieve our anxiety of unknowing with luxuriant 
portraits ot what is to come. But the experience of Destiny inevitably pulls 
the scales from our eyes, revealing the aridity of prophecy. Would that we 
had first seen the empty promises of the past and thus spurned the oracles as 
they spoke. For the history of the future already lies behind us — and it is a 
desert littered with prophetic carcasses. 
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